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INTRODUCTION 
   
Private, or more generally, funded1 pensions play an important role in the 
retirement income systems of many OECD countries. This role is expected 
to grow as recent pension reforms in many OECD countries will lead to a 
reduction in pay-as-you-go (PAYG)2 public pension benefits.3 One may ask 
of why this is so? The aim of this paper is to answer this question. 
    
 
I. AGEING SOCIETY 
 
Over the coming decades, the EU, the OECD and many countries will face a 
significant acceleration of demographic ageing due to three main factors: 
  the baby-boom generation reaching retirement age, 
  continuing increases in life expectancy, 
  decreased fertility since the 1970s.  
  It  is  said  that  the  first  of  these  factors  will  create  a  temporary 
demographic  imbalance,  while  the  effects  of  the  two  other  factors  are 
continuous.4 
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1  In a  funded  plan,  contributions  from  the  employer,  and  sometimes  also  from  plan 
members, are invested in a fund towards meeting the benefits. The future returns on the 
investments, and the future benefits to be paid, are not known in advance, so there is no 
guarantee that a given level of contributions will be sufficient to meet the benefits. 
2 In an unfunded defined benefit pension, no assets are set aside and the benefits are paid 
for  by  the  employer  or  other  pension  sponsor  as  and  when  they  are  paid  out.  Pension 
arrangements  provided  by  the  state  in  most  countries  in  the  world  are  unfunded,  with 
benefits  paid  directly  from  current  workers'  contributions  and  taxes.  This  method  of 
financing is known as Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO or PAYG). The social security systems of 
many European countries are unfunded, having benefits paid directly out of current taxes 
and social security contributions, although several countries have hybrid systems which are 
partially funded. 
3 ‘OECD Pensions Outlook 2012’ (OECD 2012) 100. 
4 ‘Adequate and sustainable pensions. Joint report by the Commission and the Council’ 
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  In the early part of the 20th century, most of the gains in total life 
expectancy were due to greater mortality at younger ages: at birth, during 
childhood and at working age. But in the second half of the 20th century, 
mortality risk at retirement ages has also fallen significantly. Between 1960 
and 2010, OECD-average life expectancy at age 65 increased by around 3.9 
years  for  men  and  5.4  years  for  women  (Figure  1).  Increases  in  life 
expectancy  at  age  60  were  larger  than  at  age  65.  The  United  Nations 
population  division  projects  further  increases  in  life  expectancy  between 
2010 and 2050. These amount to 3.1 additional years for men and 3.6 years 
for women at age 65. As in the past, the lengthening of life expectancy at 
age 60 is greater, but by a smaller margin than observed between 1960 and 
2010.5 
 
Figure 1. Life expectancy at age 60 and 65 by sex, OECD average, 1960-2050 
 
Source: Historical data on life expectancy from the OECD Health database 1960-95. Recent 
data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population 
Division database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 
 
  The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in a particular year may be defined as 
the number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live 
to the end of her childbearing years and if the likelihood of her giving birth 
to children at each age was equal to the currently prevailing age-specific 
fertility  rates.  It  is  generally  computed  by  summing  up  the  age-specific 
fertility  rates  defined  over  a  five-year  interval.  Assuming  there  are  no 
migration flows and that mortality rates remain unchanged, a total fertility 
rate of 2.1 children per woman generates broad population stability; this is 
also referred to as the ‘replacement fertility rate’, as it ensures replacement 
of  the  woman  and  her  partner  with  another  0.1  percentage  points  to 
counteract infant mortality (CO1.1). The Completed Fertility Rate (CFR) 
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presents the number of children actually born per woman for a given cohort 
of women by the end of their childbearing years. Usually, women who are 
45 (in some countries 49) or older are considered to have completed their 
childbearing years.6 
 
 
Table 1. Total fertility rates 
Country\Year  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010 
Belgium  1.62  1.56  1.67  1.76  : 
Bulgaria  1.82  1.23  1.26  1.32  1.49 
Czech Republic  1.9  1.28  1.14  1.28  1.49 
Denmark  1.67  1.8  1.77  1.8  1.87 
Germany  :  :  1.38  1.34  1.39 
Estonia  2.05  1.38  1.38  1.5  1.63 
Ireland  2.11  1.84  1.89  1.86  2.07 
Greece  1.4  1.31  1.26  1.33  1.51 
Spain  1.36  1.17  1.23  1.34  1.38 
France  :  :  1.89  1.94  2.03 
Italy  1.33  1.19  1.26  1.32  1.41 
Cyprus  2.41  2.03  1.64  1.42  1.44 
Latvia  :  :  :  1.31  1.17 
Lithuania  2.03  1.55  1.39  1.27  1.55 
Luxembourg  1.6  1.7  1.76  1.63  1.63 
Hungary  1.87  1.57  1.32  1.31  1.25 
Malta  2.04  1.81  1.7  1.38  1.38 
Netherlands  1.62  1.53  1.72  1.71  1.79 
Austria  1.46  1.42  1.36  1.41  1.44 
Poland  2.06  1.62  1.37  1.24  1.38 
Portugal  1.56  1.41  1.55  1.4  1.36 
Romania  1.83  1.33  1.31  1.32  1.33 
Slovenia  1.46  1.29  1.26  1.26  1.57 
Slovakia  2.09  1.52  1.3  1.25  1.4 
Finland  1.78  1.81  1.73  1.8  1.87 
Sweden  2.13  1.73  1.54  1.77  1.98 
United Kingdom  1.83  1.71  1.64  1.78  1.98 
Iceland  2.3  2.08  2.08  2.05  2.2 
Norway  1.93  1.87  1.85  1.84  1.95 
Switzerland  1.58  1.48  1.5  1.42  1.52 
Albania  :  :  :  1.61  : 
Croatia  :  :  :  1.41  1.46 
Montenegro  :  :  :  1.6  1.69 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia  :  2.13  1.88  1.46  1.56 
Serbia  :  :  1.48  1.45  1.4 
Turkey  :  :  :  :  2.04 
Source: Eurostat 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&
pcode=tsdde220> accessed 18 November 2012.   
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  Table 1. shows that in 2010 TFRs were well below the replacement 
rate  in  most  countries,  but  exceed  two  children  per  woman  in  Iceland, 
Ireland, Turkey and France. Among them only Iceland (2.2) was  able to 
exceed the replacement rate. In contrast, the lowest Total Fertility Rate was 
observed in Latvia (1.17) followed by Hungary (1.25) and Romania (1.33). 
Twenty years earlier the highest Total Fertility Rate was in Cyprus (2.41) 
followed by Iceland (2.3), Sweden (2.13) and Ireland (2.11). Only these four 
countries  were  able  to  exceed  the  replacement  rate.  Additionally,  five 
countries achieved TFR higher than two (Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland 
and Slovakia). In 1990, the lowest TFR value was observed in Italy (1.33) 
followed by Spain (1.36) and Greece (1.4). To sum up, in the years 1990-
1995-2000-2005-2010 we cannot find a single country with an increasing 
Total Fertility Rate. 
  Eventually, all three factors mentioned (the baby-boom generation 
reaching retirement age, continuing increases in life expectancy, decreased 
fertility  since  the  1970s)  will  combine  to  produce  a  major  financial 
challenge for pensions systems over the coming decades when the number 
of  pensioners  will  rapidly  increase  and  the  size  of  the  working  age 
population will diminish.  
 
Table 2. Projections of Old-Age Dependency in EU and EUA Countries, 2000-2050 
(ratio of people aged over 64 to working age population, percent) 
Country/Year  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
Austria  25  29  32  44  55  55 
Belgium  28  29  36  46  51  50 
Denmark  24  27  34  39  45  42 
Finland  25  28  39  47  47  48 
France  27  28  36  44  50  51 
Germany  26  33  36  47  55  53 
Greece  28  32  36  42  51  59 
Ireland  19  19  25  30  36  44 
Italy  29  34  40  49  64  67 
Luxembourg  23  26  31  40  45  42 
Netherlands  22  25  33  42  48  45 
Portugal  25  27  30  35  43  49 
Spain  27  29  33  42  56  66 
Sweden  30  31  38  43  47  46 
United Kingdom  26  27  32  40  47  46 
EU15 average  27  30  35  44  52  53 
Bulgaria  24  24  29  34  41  53 
Cyprus  18  20  26  32  34  39 
Czech Republic  20  22  32  38  47  59 
Estonia  23  25  30  36  42  57 
Hungary  21  23  29  33  40  50 
Latvia  23  26  29  37  44  56 
Lithuania  21  24  26  35  40  43 
Malta  18  22  32  39  40  46 
Poland  18  18  26  33  37  50 
Romania  20  20  24  26  36  45 
Slovak Republic  16  17  23  30  36  47 
Slovenia  20  24  32  44  53  64 
EUA average  20  22  28  35  41  51 
Source: EU countries - 'Budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations: The impact of 
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indicators of long-term financial sustainability of public finances' (European Union 2001) 
12;  EUA  countries  -  'World  Population  Prospects: The  2002  Revision'  (United  Nations 
2002) 65. 
   
  As a result, the old-age dependency ratio for the EU15 is projected to 
nearly double from 27% in 2000 to 53% by 2050 (Table 2), based on rather 
optimistic assumptions about total fertility rates (assumed to rise again to 
1.8 children per women in most countries) and life expectancy (assumed to 
rise less than in the past).7 The projection for the EU accession countries 
(EUA) goes even further (Table 2). The old-age dependency ratio for these 
countries is projected to increase from 20% in 2000 to 51% by 2050. In 
2000, the lowest old-age dependency ratios can be found in Ireland (19%), 
and the Slovak Republic (16%) for EU and  EUA countries respectively. In 
contrast, the highest ratios were observed in Sweden (30%), and Bulgaria 
(24%) for EU and EUA countries respectively. According to the projections, 
in 2050 the lowest the old-age dependency ratio among EU countries should 
be found in Luxembourg and Denmark (both 42%). In projections for EUA 
countries the lowest ratio is in Cyprus (39%). On the other hand, the highest 
ratios are projected in Italy (67%), and Slovenia (64%) for EU and EUA 
countries respectively. Taking into account the period from 2000-2050, the 
highest increase of old-age dependency ratios can be found in Spain (39%), 
and Slovenia (44%) for EU and EUA countries respectively.  
  Based on these projected changes in old-age dependency ratios in the 
East and the West, and in a no-reform scenario, expenditures would roughly 
increase.8 Confirmation of this process can be seen in the forthcoming table. 
  According  to Table  3,  Italy  has  spent  the  largest  proportion  of 
national income on pensions among OECD countries since  2007: 14.1% 
(nearly one-seventh) of GDP. Other countries with high public pension 
spending are also found in continental Europe, with Austria, France and 
Greece at about 12% of GDP and Germany, Poland and Portugal at about 
11%. Pensions generally account for between 25% and 30% of total public 
expenditure  in  these  countries.  High  spending  partly  results  from 
demographics:  these  seven  countries  are  among  the  oldest  of  OECD 
countries. The left-hand chart compares pension spending in 2007 with the 
old-age dependency ratio for that year. There is a strong relationship, but it 
is far from deterministic. Countries such as Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the  United  Kingdom  face  similar  or  worse  demographics  but  have 
significantly lower pension spending than the seven countries at the top of 
the scale. Iceland, Korea and Mexico spend less than 2% of GDP on public 
pensions.  They  are  all  relatively  young  countries. Also,  Korea’s  pension 
system  is  immature:  the  public,  earnings-related  scheme  was  only 
established in 1998.  In Mexico, low spending also reflects the relatively 
                                                           
7 Robert Holzmann, Landis MacKellar, and Michal Rutkowski, ‘Accelerating the European 
Pension  reform  agenda:  need,  progress,  and  conceptual  underpinnings’  in  Robert 
Holzmann,  Mitchell  Orenstein,  Michal  Rutkowski  (eds.)  Pension  reform  in  Europe: 
Process and Progress (The World Bank 2003) 4. 
8 Robert Holzmann and Edward Palmer, Pension Reform. Issues and Prospects for Non-
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narrow coverage of pensions (only around 35% of employees). In Iceland, 
much  of  retirement  income  is  provided  by  compulsory  occupational 
schemes, leaving less of a role for the public sector in providing old-age 
income. Spending also tends to be low in other countries with favourable 
demographics,  such  as  Australia,  Canada,  Ireland  and  New  Zealand. 
However, this is not always the case: Turkey spends 6% of GDP on public 
pensions despite being the second-youngest OECD country in demographic 
terms. This is more than Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, despite the fact that these countries have 2-3 times as 
many over-65s relative to population as Turkey does.9 
  Pension spending was a fairly stable proportion of GDP over the 
period  1990-2007  in  six  countries:  Belgium,  Canada,  Ireland,  Spain, 
Sweden and the United States. In five countries, public pension spending 
grew more slowly than national income. In New Zealand, the decline  of 
over 40% reflects two policies: freezing the value of the basic pension in 
1992-94  and  increasing  the  pension  age  from  60  to  65.  There  were 
significant  falls  in  pension  spending  in  Iceland,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands and Norway as well. Public pension   expenditure more than 
doubled relative to national income in six OECD countries.  In Korea, 
Mexico and (to a lesser degree) Turkey, this reflected the low starting point 
in 1990. However, Poland and Portugal moved from spending below the 
OECD average to well above it. The change in Japan results from rapid 
demographic ageing.10 
 
Table 3. Public expenditure on old-age and survivors benefits 
  
Level (% of GDP)  Change 
(%) 
Level (% of 
total 
government 
spending) 
1990  1995  2000  2005  2007 
1990-
2007  1990  2007 
Australia  3.0  3.6  3.8  3.3  3.4  11.2  8.6  10.1 
Austria  11.4  12.3  12.3  12.5  12.3  7.8  22.1  25.3 
Belgium  9.1  9.4  8.9  9.0  8.9  -2.9  17.4  18.3 
Canada  4.2  4.7  4.3  4.2  4.2  -1.2  8.5  10.6 
Chile     6.9  7.5  5.9  5.2          
Czech 
Republic  6.1  6.3  7.5  7.3  7.4  21.8     17.5 
Denmark  5.1  6.2  5.3  5.4  5.6  8.6  9.2  10.9 
Estonia        6.0  5.3  5.2        15.2 
Finland  7.3  8.8  7.7  8.4  8.3  13.3  15.1  17.5 
France  10.6  12.0  11.8  12.3  12.5  17.5  21.5  23.9 
Germany  9.0  10.7  11.2  11.5  10.7  19.1     24.5 
                                                           
9 ‘Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries’ 
(OECD 2011) 154. 
10  <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/pensions-at-a-glance-
2011_5km4sjtc8vzw.pdf;jsessionid=1l32th7u46gi2.x-oecd-live-
01?contentType=/ns/StatisticalPublication,/ns/Book&itemId=/content/book/pension_glance
-2011-
en&containerItemId=/content/serial/19991363&accessItemIds=&mimeType=application/p
df> 
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Greece  9.9  9.6  10.7  11.7  11.9  20.9     26.3 
Hungary        7.4  8.6  9.1        18.3 
Iceland  2.2  2.4  2.2  2.0  1.9  -14.7     4.5 
Ireland  3.9  3.5  3.1  3.4  3.6  -7.7  9.0  9.7 
Israel     4.7  4.9  5.1  4.8        10.7 
Italy  10.1  11.3  13.6  14.0  14.1  38.9  19.1  29.4 
Japan  4.9  6.1  7.4  8.7  8.8  80.5     27.0 
Korea  0.7  1.2  1.4  1.5  1.7  130.5  3.7  5.7 
Luxembourg  8.2  8.8  7.5  7.2  6.5  -19.8  21.6  18.1 
Mexico  0.5  0.7  0.9  1.2  1.4  202.0     7.2 
Netherlands  6.7  5.8  5.0  5.0  4.7  -29.8  12.2  10.4 
New Zealand  7.4  5.7  5.0  4.3  4.3  -41.8  14.0  10.9 
Norway  5.6  5.5  4.8  4.8  4.7  -16.6     11.4 
Poland  5.1  9.4  10.5  11.4  10.6  107.0     25.2 
Portugal  4.9  7.2  7.9  10.3  10.8  119.8       
Slovak 
Republic     6.3  6.3  6.2  5.8        17.0 
Slovenia        10.6  9.9  9.6        22.7 
Spain  7.9  9.0  8.6  8.1  8.0  1.5     20.5 
Sweden  7.7  8.2  7.2  7.6  7.2  -6.8     14.1 
Switzerland  5.6  6.7  6.6  6.8  6.4  14.2  18.6  19.9 
Turkey  2.4  2.7  4.9  5.9  6.1  159.2       
United 
Kingdom  4.8  5.4  5.3  5.6  5.4  11.0  11.6  12.0 
United States  6.1  6.3  5.9  5.9  6.0  -1.5  16.4  16.3 
OECD34  6.1  6.7  6.9  7.1  7.0  14.5      16.5 
Source: OECD Social Expenditures database (SOCX); OECD Main Economic Indicators 
database. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932371063> accessed 18 November 2012. 
 
 
II. PAY-AS-YOU-GO VS FULLY FUNDED 
 
  As one can see, rapid ageing of the population around the world is a 
major challenge to affordability of pensions and financial sustainability of 
retirement  income  systems.  In  fact,  pension  policy  has  always  involved 
balancing the adequacy of benefits with their affordability. This balancing 
act has got harder as a result of the recent economic and financial crisis. It 
adds to the existing and much greater challenge to pension systems arising 
from population ageing. Despite these short-term problems, it is important 
to remember that pensions are a long-term issue. In the first instance, there 
is an obvious trade-off between adequacy and sustainability: higher public 
pensions deliver larger incomes in old age but cost more. However, if public 
pensions are at risk of being inadequate, there will be pressure for ad hoc 
increases in pensions or supplementary retirement benefits to prevent old-
age poverty. 
Similarly, pension benefits can be too high, rendering the system financially 
unsustainable. If governments delay reforms, then the scale of adjustment to 
benefits  needed  in  the  medium  or  long  term  will  be  more  sudden  and 
painful.  Greece,  Hungary  and  Ireland  have  all  had  to  accept  substantial 
pension reforms as part of the fiscal consolidation required for international 
bail-outs.  Such  sudden  changes  make  it  very  difficult  for  individuals  to 
change  their  work,  retirement  and  savings  decisions  to  reflect  the  new 118  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 2:2 
 
financial  realities.  How  can  governments  maintain  retirement  income 
adequacy without endangering financial sustainability? There are two main 
routes out of this dilemma.11 Major reforms and minor (parametric) ones. 
Minor reforms of pay-as-you-go systems broken down into type of reform, 
measure of change as well as chosen action are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Parametric (minor) reforms of traditional (pay-as-you-go) systems 
Type of 
reform 
Measure of change  Action 
Eligibility 
criteria  
Retirement age  Altering the retirement age or the service years 
required to qualify for a pension.  Service years 
Contribution 
structure 
 
Coverage  Raising the contribution rates of employers rather 
than that of employees and abolishing minimum 
income limits or increasing the maximum income 
limits  on  which  the  contributions  are  made,  to 
maximize the total amount of 
contributions collected. 
Contribution rate 
Contribution base 
Source 
Taxation of 
contributors 
Benefit 
structure 
 
Benefit formula  Countries  with  older  populations  (such  as 
Portugal and Switzerland) decreased accrual rates 
or  increased  the  number  of  years  used  to 
calculate the pensionable salary (which decreases 
it), leading to lower replacement rates. However, 
younger countries (such as Senegal and Sudan) 
modified their pension formulas (through higher 
accrual rates, higher pensionable salary or higher 
percent of replacement) such that they increased 
their  benefits. As  to  changing  the  way  benefits 
are  indexed  to  inflation,  the  most  important 
improvements  were  for  those  countries  that 
replaced their ad hoc inflation adjustment with a 
structured  adjustment,  whether  they  tied  these 
adjustments to price or wage changes. 
Pension base 
Indexation 
Minimum pension 
Payment form 
Taxation of benefits 
Administratio
n 
Ministerial 
authority 
Strengthening the role of public administration. 
Investment policy 
Source: AM Schwarz, A Demirguc-Kunt, Taking stock of pension reforms around the world 
(The World Bank 1999) 19.  
 
  Unfortunately, the parametric reforms mentioned offer only limited 
options.  Raised  contribution  rates  have  negative  effects  on  the  labour 
market,  encourage  evasion  and  are  unpopular.  Moreover,  the  cost  of  the 
system falls on the younger generations because despite parametric changes, 
unfunded liabilities have continued to increase in many countries. To cut a 
long story short, the effect of parametric changes on the financial balance of 
the system is only temporary. 
  To  deal  with  it  on  a  permanent  basis,  countries  should  replace 
(totally  or  partially)  public  pay-as-you-go  systems  with  private,  fully-
funded,  individual  programs.  Why?  Because  in  a  private,  fully-funded 
individual program: 
                                                           
11 ‘Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries’ 
(OECD 2011) 9. 
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  Each member pays a percentage of his/her gross wage into an 
individual account which is his/her personal property. 
  The  pension  fund  administrators  (AFP),  manage  the 
resources  that  have  been  deposited,  investing  them  in  financial 
instruments, which produces a return. 
  The AFPs’ investment instruments are regulated by law and 
are duly diversified. 
  There  is  independence  between  the  pension  fund  and  the 
company managing it. 
  The AFPs charge a commission for managing the resources. 
  When the member retires, he/she has access to the resources 
that have been accumulated, plus the interest gained by the yield of 
the investments, in the form of a pension. 
  The  member  chooses  the  pension  mode:  Programmed 
Withdrawal or Life Annuity.12 
  Moreover, fully-funded pensions have a positive influence on the 
financial markets. To be more specific, three basic channels of the impact of 
funded pensions on financial development can be distinguished. Firstly, 
direct changes in savings and the size and composition of the financial 
system as a result of a move of mandatory pension contributions from a 
PAYG to a funded system. Pension reform can affect the savings rate of the 
economy and hence change the level of financial intermediation. Secondly, 
direct effects on financial intermediation are also to be expected. If the 
transition from a PAYG to a funded system takes place through the issuing 
of public debt, market capitalization will grow and the maturity of public 
debt could increase. The development of a public debt market could in turn 
foster the growth of the market for private securities. Thirdly, changes could 
occur in the efficiency and composition of financial intermediation as a 
result of the emergence of pension funds and other institutional investors. 
Some improvements in the operation of the financial system may result 
from  regulatory  reform  and  the  operation  of  pension  funds  and  other 
institutional investors that would participate in the new funded system.13 
   
Table 5 Expansion of the mandatory fully-funded pension 
Country  Year when the mandatory fully-funded 
individual system began 
Chile  1981 
Peru  1993 
Colombia  1994 
Uruguay  1996 
Bolivia, Mexico  1997 
El Salvador, Hungary, Kazakhstan  1998 
                                                           
12  AE  Guillermo,  ‘Ageing  and  fully-funded  pensions’    Presentation  prepared  for  the 
International  Symposium  on  Business  Responses  to  the  Demographic  Challenge 
(Geneva, 28th and 29th April 2009). 
13 J Yermo, The Role of Funded Pensions in Retirement Income Systems: Issues for the 
Russian Federation (OECD 2012) 12. 120  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 2:2 
 
Poland  1999 
Costa Rica  2000 
Latvia  2001 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Kosovo, Panama (*)  2002 
Russian Federation, Dominican Republic  2003 
Croatia, Lithuania, India (*)  2004 
Slovakia, Macedonia, Nigeria  2005 
Romanía  2008 
Ukraine (**)    
Armenia (***)   
(*) Reform for employees in the Public Sector. 
(**) Reform passed but not implemented. 
(***) Reform proposed but not yet passed or implemented. 
Source: Mariusz Dybał Efektywność inwestycyjna funduszy emerytalnych (CeDeWu 2008) 
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  Therefore  it  is  not  surprising  that  more  and  more  countries  are 
choosing the fully-funded pension. Table 5 demonstrates that 25 countries 
have  set  up  mandatory,  fully-funded,  individual  programs  and  other 
countries are in the middle of the legislative process. 
  All  pensions,  whether  PAYG-financed  or  funded,  are  claims  on 
future production. In a theoretical economic sense, therefore, it matters little 
how pensions are financed, as ultimately it is the current working population 
that has to produce the goods and services that will be consumed by the 
retired population. However, the practice is rather different for four main 
reasons:  
  Funded pensions can rely on foreign investment to finance future 
benefits. To the extent that one can invest  in  economies  growing 
faster than the one where the pensioner is based, the final pension 
pot can be increased; 
  PAYG pensions  can be linked to  some extent to the evolution of 
wages in the economy. To the extent that wages follow inflation, 
PAYG systems can provide good inflation protection to pensioners;  
  Funded pensions rely on the accumulation of assets whose market 
price  at  any  time  may  differ  from  the  fundamental  value  of  the 
underlying capital assets. This market risk is borne by individuals 
and will cause fluctuations in the level of pension benefits unless 
there are risk sharing and pooling mechanisms in place. At the same 
time, market risk, or more generally the volatility of financial asset 
prices, is associated with risk premium, that is, an excess of returns 
over assets with little or no risk;  
  PAYG  pensions  rely  on  an  implicit  intergenerational  contract 
between the working and the retired population. When demographic 
or  economic  conditions  change,  this  contract  can  break  down. 
Demographic  ageing  and  slow  growth  create  a  natural  stress  on 
intergenerational  contracts.  As  the  size  of  the  elderly  population 
increases, so does its political power, at a time when financing the 
same level of pensions becomes increasingly difficult. By contrast, 
with funded pensions, claims consist of securities that have legally 
enforceable rights to payments from companies or the state. 2012]  FUNDED PENSIONS - A REMEDY FOR AN AGEING 
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  From this discussion, it is clear that both PAYG and funded systems 
have advantages and disadvantages. For precisely this reason, the OECD 
has  often  stressed  the  need  for  a  mixed-financing14  pension system that 
combines PAYG and funding to achieve an adequate level of retirement 
income.15 
 
 
Figure 2 Taxonomy: different types of retirement-income provision 
 
Source: See Chapter 1 of 'Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies across OECD Countries' 
(OECD 2005) and 'OECD Classification and Glossary of Private Pensions'  (OECD 2004) 
for a more detailed discussion of classification issues. 
  The framework, shown in Figure 2, presents this mixed-financing 
pension system. The redistributive first-tier comprises programmes designed 
to ensure pensioners achieve a minimum standard of living. The second-tier 
savings components are designed to achieve a target standard of living in 
retirement  compared  with  the  one  maintained  during  the  pensioner's 
working years. Within these tiers (pillars), schemes are classified further by 
provider (public PAYG or private fully-funded) and the way benefits are 
determined.  
  Using  this  framework,  the  architecture  of  national  multi-pillar 
schemes is shown in the table 6. Programs aimed to prevent poverty in old 
age – first-tier, redistributive schemes – are provided by the public sector 
and of three main types: Resource-tested; Basic; Minimum. 
  Resource-tested  or  targeted  plans  pay  a  higher  benefit  to  poorer 
pensioners and reduced  benefits  to  better-off retirees.  In these plans, the 
value of benefits depends either on income from other sources or on both 
income and assets. All countries have general social safety-nets of this type, 
but in some cases they only cover a few older people who experienced many 
career interruptions. Rather than mark every country in the table, only 12 
OECD countries are marked in this column. Full-career workers with low 
earnings (30% of the average) would be entitled to resource-tested benefits 
in  these  countries.  Basic  schemes  pay  either  flat-rate  benefits  (the  same 
amount to every retiree) or their value depends only on years of work, not 
                                                           
14 See Mariusz Dybał, ‘Istota i rodzaje systemów emerytalnych’ in Leon Olszewski (ed.) 
Ekonomia 18 (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego 2010) 237. 
15 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9180xv25xw-enf> accessed 18 November 2012. 
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on  past  earnings.  Additional  retirement  income  does  not  change  the 
entitlement. Some 13 OECD countries have a basic pension scheme or other 
provisions  with  a  similar  effect.  Minimum  pensions,  which  share  many 
features with resource-tested plans, are found in 18 OECD countries. The 
value  of  entitlements  takes  account  only  of  pension  income;  unlike 
resource-tested  schemes,  it  is  not  affected  by  income  from  savings,  etc. 
Minimum credits in earnings-related schemes, such as those in Belgium and 
the United Kingdom, have a similar effect: benefits for workers with very 
low earnings are calculated as if the worker had earned at a higher level. 
Only  Ireland  and  New  Zealand  among  OECD  countries  do  not  have  a 
mandatory second-tier provision.16 
  In the other 32 countries, there are four kinds of schemes:  Defined-
benefit (DB); points; Defined-contribution (DC); notional accounts. 
   Defined-benefit (DB) plans are provided by the public sector in 18 
OECD countries. Private (occupational) schemes are mandatory or quasi-
mandatory in 
three  OECD  countries  (Iceland,  the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland). 
Retirement income depends on the number of years of contributions and 
individual  earnings  There  are  points  schemes  in  four  OECD  countries: 
French occupational plans (operated by the public sector) and the Estonian, 
German and Slovak public schemes. Workers earn pension points based on 
their  earnings  each  year.  At  retirement,  the  sum  of  pension  points  is 
multiplied by a pension-point value to convert them into a regular pension 
payment.  Defined-contribution  (DC)  plans  are  compulsory  in  11  OECD 
countries. In these schemes, contributions flow into an individual account. 
The  accumulation  of  contributions  and  investment  returns  is  usually 
converted  into  a  pension-income  stream  at  retirement.  In  Denmark  and 
Sweden, there are quasi-mandatory, 
occupational DC schemes in addition to smaller compulsory plans. There 
are  notional  accounts  schemes  in  four  OECD  countries  (Italy,  Norway, 
Poland and Sweden). These record contributions in an individual account 
and apply a rate of return to the balances. The accounts are ‘notional’ in that 
the  balances  exist  only  on  the  books  of  the  managing  institution.  At 
retirement, the accumulated notional capital is converted into a stream of 
pension payments using a formula based on life expectancy. Since this is 
designed  to  mimic  DC  schemes,  they  are  often  called  notional  defined-
contribution plans (NDC).17 
 
Table  6 Structure of retirement-income provision 
OECD members 
Public  Public  Privat
e 
Resource-
tested 
Basi
c 
Minimu
m  Type  Type 
Australia            DC 
Austria           DB    
                                                           
16 ‘Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries’ 
(OECD 2011) 107. 
17 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-enx> accessed 18 November 2012. 2012]  FUNDED PENSIONS - A REMEDY FOR AN AGEING 
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Belgium       DB    
Canada       DB    
Chile          DC 
Czech Republic       DB    
Denmark          DC 
Estonia         Points  DC 
Finland         DB    
France       
 DB+point
s    
Germany         Points    
Greece         DB    
Hungary           DB  DC 
Iceland          DB 
Ireland              
Israel            DC 
Italy         NDC    
Japan         DB    
Korea       DB    
Luxembourg     DB    
Mexico            DC 
Netherlands            DB 
New Zealand              
Norway         NDC  DC 
Poland         NDC  DC 
Portugal         DB    
Slovak Republic         Points  DC 
Slovenia         DB    
Spain         DB    
Sweden         NDC  DC 
Switzerland       DB  DB  
Turkey         DB    
United Kingdom     DB    
United States           DB    
Other major economies 
Argentina         DB    
Brazil           DB    
China         NDC/DC    
India           DB + DC    
Indonesia           DC    124  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 2:2 
 
Russian Federation         NDC  DC 
Saudi Arabia         DB    
South Africa              
Note: In Iceland and Switzerland, the government sets contribution rates, minimum rates of return 
and  the  annuity  rate  at  which  the  accumulation  is  converted  into  a  pension  for  mandatory 
occupational plans. These schemes are therefore implicitly defined benefit. DB = Defined benefit; 
DC = Defined contribution; NDC = Notional accounts.  
Source: ‘Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries’ 
(OECD 2011) 107. 
 
 
III. IMPACT OF FINANCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND OTHER RISKS ON 
PAYG AND FUNDED PENSION SYSTEMS 
 
  The principal advantage of a multi-pillar pension scheme lies in risk 
diversification. Not all of the population’s retirement portfolio will be held 
hostage to political and demographic risk, if only because the PAYG system 
no longer looms so large in the country’s public finances. Most or all of the 
same  issues  of  regulation,  capital  market  development  and  market 
fluctuation  also  exist  in  a  multi-pillar  approach  and  require  solutions. 
Because it is only part of a larger system, however, the funded component 
can operate with fewer governmental constraints on the long-run investment 
options offered to contributors. More importantly, the multi-pillar approach 
recognizes that countries face a variety of risks over the long term and no 
one  instrument  can  fully  anticipate  all  those  risks.  In  fact,  some  non-
systemic risks, such as certain catastrophes, may not be diversified at all. 
Table 7 summarizes how a multi-pillar approach balances long-run risks.18 
 
Table 7. Responsiveness to Main Risks 
Type of risk\Type of 
scheme 
Unfunded Schemes  Fully-funded Schemes 
Macroeconomic Risks 
 
 
Negative output shocks   lower revenue, but effects on 
individuals can be mitigated 
possible effects on 
financing which can be 
mitigated 
Unemployment  lower revenue, but effects on 
individuals can be mitigated 
no effect on financing, but 
concerned individual 
receives future lower 
benefits 
Low wage growth  lower revenue, but effects on 
individuals can be mitigated 
no effect on financing and 
current 
benefit level 
Financial crisis 
(depression, war, 
hyperinflation, natural 
disaster) 
possible lower revenue, but 
effects on individual can be 
mitigated 
accumulated stock reduced 
or even 
eliminated 
Low rates of return  no direct effects on financing 
and benefits 
no effects on financing but 
lower 
                                                           
18 Robert Holzmann, The World Bank approach to pension reform (The World Bank 1999) 
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benefits 
Demographic Risks 
 
 
Higher dependency ratio  deteriorating financing  no direct effects on 
financing and 
benefit level 
Smaller labor force  higher wages and future 
benefit 
levels 
lower returns and future 
benefit levels 
Political Risks 
 
 
Contract change  Easy  Difficult 
Responsiveness to short 
and 
long-term budget 
constraints 
High  Low 
Source: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-
Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/9807.pdf > accessed 18 November 2012. 
 
  Governments  have  realized  that  the  advantages  of  a  multi-pillar 
pension  system  outweigh  the  disadvantages.  Therefore,  thirteen  of  the 
thirty-four  OECD  countries  (figure  3)  have  some  form  of  mandatory  or 
quasi-mandatory  private  fully-funded  pension  system  in  place,  which 
generally  ensures  high  coverage  of  the  working  age  population.  When 
combining  PAYG  and  mandatory  or  quasi-mandatory  private  pension 
systems, net pension replacement rates for workers on average earnings are 
above  60%  of  the  worker’s  final  salary  in  these  countries,  except  in 
Australia, Estonia, Sweden and Mexico. In total, thirteen OECD countries 
have  an  aggregate  net  replacement  rate  below  60%.  Two  other  OECD 
countries,  Hungary  and  the  Slovak  Republic,  used  to  have  mandatory 
private pension systems but have recently changed enrolment rules, with a 
dramatic  effect  on  coverage,  especially  in  Hungary.  In  this  country,  the 
government  decided  to  effectively  close  down  the  mandatory  private 
pension  system  at  the  end  of  2010.  Contributions  to  the  system  were 
suspended  between  1  November  2010  and  31  December  2011,  with  the 
whole  of  social  security  contributions  flowing  to  the  Pension  Insurance 
Fund  thereafter.  The  vast  share  of  pension  fund  assets  accumulated  by 
members  was  transferred  back  to  the  state. As  a  result,  coverage  of  the 
mandatory system plunged from 45.4% of the working age population at the 
end of 2010 (as shown o figure 3) to 1.5% at the end of September 2011. 
From  2012  on,  the  mandatory  private  pension  system  does  not  exist 
anymore. Former participants in the mandatory private pension system will 
only accrue public pension rights.19 
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Figure 3. Net pension replacement rates from PAYG and mandatory private pension 
systems for average earners
 
Source: 'OECD Pensions Outlook 2012' (OECD 2012) 106. 
 
  As a result of reforms, privately managed, funded pension plans are 
an increasingly important part of retirement income systems. As shown in 
Figure  4,  private  pensions  will  account  for  over  50%  of  total  pension 
benefits  for  workers  that  start  their  careers  today  in  countries  such  as 
Australia,  Chile,  Mexico,  Poland,  Slovak  Republic  and  the  United 
Kingdom. In these countries, private pensions for new entrants to the labour 
force  are  predominantly  provided  in  the  form  of  defined  contribution 
arrangements,  where  members  bear  all  investment  risk  during  the 
accumulation stage. As a result, pension benefits are likely to exhibit a great 
degree of variability both within and across generations, even for workers 
with similar wage, contribution and longevity profiles.20 
                                                           
20  See  P Antolín,  ‘Private  Pensions  and  the  Financial  Crisis:  How  to  Ensure Adequate 
Retirement  Income  from  DC  Pension  Plans’  (OECD  2009) 
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Figure 4. The role of private pensions in the overall retirement income package by 
type of provision 
 
Notes: Countries with mandatory or quasi-mandatory private pension systems may also 
have a voluntary part which is not shown here.  
The calculations are based on national pension rules and parameters applying in 2008.  
Source: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932598702> accessed 18 November 2012. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
  In  order  to  adapt  pension  systems  to  demographic  trends,  many 
countries  are  reducing  pay-as-you-go  public  pension  levels  and  altering 
retirement ages. In this context, funded private pensions as a part of a multi-
pillar  system  could  play  an  important  role  in  avoiding  adequacy  gaps. 
Therefore, as this article shows, the coverage of funded pensions is highly 
uneven across countries and between individuals,  especially in  voluntary 
systems.  Some  countries  have  made  funded  pensions  compulsory  (e.g. 
Australia,  Chile,  Poland)  or  quasi-mandatory  (e.g.  the  Netherlands)  to 
ensure  that  most  workers  are  covered  and  therefore  have  access  to  a 
sufficiently high complementary pension. However, in other countries with 
relatively  low  PAYG  public  pension  benefits,  funded  private  provision 
remains  voluntary. The  low  level  of  funded  pensions’  coverage  in  those 
countries should be a major policy concern.  
  To conclude, countries all over the world are reforming their pension 
systems. Most are reforming to decrease the fiscal costs of their existing 
pension  systems. A  few  relatively  young  countries  are  establishing  new 
systems or are increasing the generosity of their current systems, although 
perhaps not always taking into account the future fiscal costs entailed in the 
increased generosity. Nevertheless, the majority of the pension reforms are 
tinkering with an existing pay-as-you-go defined benefit system, rather than 
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reform of the overall system of pension provision. However, while these 
minor reforms alleviate some of the fiscal burden, fiscal problems reappear 
in the long term. The only way to effectively solve the pension system issue 
on  a  permanent  basis  is  to  move  toward  the  fully-funded  defined 
contribution  reforms  currently  underway  in  Latin  America,  Australia, 
Central and Eastern Europe and under consideration in a variety of other 
countries. 